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INTRODUCTION
In order to "pursue its goal of assuring the highest standards of professional
competence and ethical conduct,"' the American Bar Association (ABA) pub-
lishes the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These rules form the basis for the
Yale Law School, J.D. expected 2011; Harvard University, A.B. 2006. I would like
to thank Professor Robert Gordon for his valuable comments, my lead editor Fran
Faircloth for her guidance and tolerance, and my fianc6e Karima for all her love
and support.
1. Model Rules of Prof' Conduct preface (2000).
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ethical requirements imposed by many state bars, as well as states' legal regula-
tion of the profession.
However, while the Model Rules aspire to bring out the best in the profes-
sion, one rule in particular seems crafted to achieve the very opposite. Model
Rule 7.3 regulates "direct contact with prospective clients," limiting solicitation
by attorneys of persons known to be in need of legal counsel and prohibiting
real-time solicitation altogether. The rule states, in relevant part,
(a) A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone or real-time elec-
tronic contact solicit professional employment from a prospective
client when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's
pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:
(i) is a lawyer; or
(2) has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with
the lawyer.
Various state bars have imposed similar strictures with disciplinary conse-
quences for violators. The rule also tracks many states' historical prohibitions
on the practice of barratry.3
Model Rule 7.3 is the last vestige of the organized bar's antipathy towards
lawyers' active solicitation of clients. The ABA justifies the rule as a protection
of prospective clients from the "potential for abuse inherent in . . . . [a situa-
tion] fraught with the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and
over-reaching." 4 This is only a recent development; for most of its history, the
professional elite were primarily worried that solicitation would "stir up litiga-
tion" and transform the prestigious practice of the law into a base trade driven
by the pursuit of wealth.' Such rationales have overtly regressive implications.
The worry that solicitation would stir up litigation oftentimes masked an
underlying fear that the poor and disempowered would utilize the legal system
2. Id. R. 7.3(a). For the purpose of simplicity, I call the practices prohibited by
sections (a) and (b) of Model Rule 7.3 "direct solicitation" throughout this Note.
When I use the term "solicitation," I intend its usual connotation of any efforts to
contact would-be clients in order to drum up business.
3. Barratry is defined as "Vexatious incitement to litigation, esp. by soliciting poten-
tial legal clients." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 170 (9th ed. 2009); see also KERRY M.
DIGGIN, 14 AM. JUR. 2D CHAMPERTY, MAINTENANCE, ETc. § 16 (2010) ("Barratry,
or common barratry, was a crime at common law and has been defined as the
offense of frequently exciting or stirring up suits and quarrels between others.").
Some state barratry laws still appear to be particularly severe. See, e.g.,
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.12(a)(2) (West 2009) ("A person commits an offense
if, with intent to obtain an economic benefit the person ... solicits employment,
either in person or by telephone, for himself or for another.").
4. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt.1 (2000).
5. See infra Part I.
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to advance their own interests.6 Furthermore, the notion that the practice of law
should transcend pecuniary concerns is squarely the privilege of the most finan-
cially secure members of the profession.
In recent years, the bar's power to regulate the pursuit of clients has dimi-
nished. In Bates v. State Bar ofArizona,7 the Supreme Court determined that the
First Amendment extended some protection to attorney advertising, and the
case law since then has, for the most part, expanded this sphere. Forced to
retreat, the organized bar still holds sway over direct solicitation of prospective
clients. The result is a senseless policy. Prospective clients lose access to useful
information. Adversely situated third parties manipulate the uneducated. More
established and elite elements of the bar enjoy an artificial advantage over
newcomers and personal injury lawyers. The direct solicitation that does occur
is dominated by poor-quality or unethical practitioners. Whether the result of
some well-intentioned mistake or rent-seeking subterfuge, Model Rule 7.3 is not
good policy. The prescription this Note sets forth is simple: Abolish the Rule
and any other limitations on direct solicitation beyond those already regulating
the formation of contracts.
This Note proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I briefly chronicle client solicita-
tion by lawyers in United States history. Part I explains that the origins of the
current ban arose not from a concern for protecting vulnerable clients but out
of a fear that solicitation might stir up litigation and dishonor the profession.
Part II then describes the liberalization of client solicitation since the 1970s. The
Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the blanket ban on direct
solicitation through reliance on its commercial speech jurisprudence. Part III
critiques Model Rule 7.3. I argue first that the exceptions to the ban on direct
solicitation may cause more harm than good, suggesting a possible ulterior
motive for the rule. I then explain how the rule's alleged purpose-protecting
vulnerable individuals from exploitation by unscrupulous lawyers-is better
served with direct solicitation than without it. Part III also considers the infor-
mation deficits and market asymmetries caused by the rule, as well as its effects
within the legal profession. In Part IV, I reexamine the historical argument that
solicitation is harmful because it stirs up litigation. I contend that this rationale
can be reframed as an argument that litigation often arises at the expense of
superior options, and direct solicitation creates incentives on the part of lawyers
to avoid these better alternatives. However, despite this improved version of the
argument, I still conclude that the needs of justice are better served with direct
solicitation than without it. A brief Conclusion follows in which I suggest some
means of attorney regulation that are superior to the blanket ban on direct
solicitation.
6. See id.
7. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOLICITATION IN THE UNITED STATES
Solicitation of potential clients, particularly direct solicitation, has long
been regarded as a discredit to the legal profession. The origins of this
sentiment date back to medieval England and appear to have had two separate,
yet related, rationales. First, the bar sought to avoid defiling itself with base
economic motives. Lawyering was a form of public service, not a trade, and it
constituted a breach of etiquette to behave otherwise.' English barristers, for
example, traditionally wore black robes that included a small pocket in the back
in which solicitors would surreptitiously place the barrister's fees since the law-
yer, as a gentleman, should not be motivated by financial gain or even be aware
of how much he was paid.9
Second, solicitation was believed to "stir up litigation," which was a crime
in England since at least the fourteenth century.o Historical accounts differ as
to the underlying reason behind this antipathy. Several accounts voice the wor-
ry of the time that involving third party legal representation would precipitate
unjust outcomes in an imperfect system: The abler advocate might manipulate
procedural niceties to triumph over the righteous claimant," and apparently,
the courts were particularly susceptible to corruption.' Others claim that litiga-
tion was simply viewed as an evil per se. 3 It is possible that both views are right:
Though the justice system eventually purged many of the defects that precipi-
tated the anti-litigation animus, perhaps sentiment failed to keep pace with
reality, enabling opposition to client solicitation to persist despite the lack of an
underlying rationale. And, as with the historical rationale against champerty,14
some feared that allowing individuals to profit, rather than simply find justice,
8. Id. at 371 ("Early lawyers in Great Britain viewed the law as a form of public
service, rather than as a means of earning a living, and they looked down on
'trade' as unseemly." (citing 5 H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210-11 (1953))).
9. See William Hornsby, Clashes of Class and Cash: Battles from the 15o Years War To
Govern Client Development, 37 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 255, 258 (2005).
10. See Comment, A Critical Analysis of Rules Against Solicitation by Lawyers, 25 U.
CHI. L. REV. 674, 675 (1958).
11. See Max Radin, Maintenance by Champerty, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 48, 56 (1935).
12. See Comment, supra note lo, at 675.
13. See Note, Advertising, Solicitation and the Profession's Duty To Make Legal Counsel
Available, 81 YALE L.J. i8i, 1188-89 (1972).
14. Though disagreement exists over the specific elements required to prove cham-
perty, it has generally been understood as "an agreement to divide litigation
proceeds between the owner of the litigated claim and a party unrelated to the
lawsuit who supports or helps enforce the claim." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY,
supra note 3, at 262.
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from litigation meant that improper cases would find their way into the courts
at a greater rate.1 5
Though limitations on barratry extend back to medieval England, the histo-
ry of ethical limitations on lawyer solicitation of clients has a uniquely Ameri-
can story. The work of Roscoe Pound, the famed dean of Harvard Law School,
provides a useful chronicle." The colonial period's regime expressed deep-
seated hostility to the idea of a professional bar; mid- seventeenth-century
Virginia, for example, prohibited engaging in legal representation "for any kind
of reward or profit directly or indirectly. . . ."11 The result was a black market of
sorts for legal representation, where "the work that ought to have been in the
hands of trained, responsible members of a profession fell of necessity into the
hands of officers of the court, sharpers and pettifoggers."'" These pettifoggers
practiced a sort of "mercenary" lawyering, actively soliciting business, and were
condemned by contemporaries such as John Adams for fomenting unnecessary
lawsuits.19 As in England, the animus stemmed once again from opposition to
"stirring up litigation" 0 and the impropriety of turning the legal profession into
a business. It appears that critics of solicitation soon began conflating these two
distinct rationales, though, decrying the stirring up of litigation precisely be-
cause it reflected poorly on the profession.
By the nineteenth century, however, the pendulum had swung to the oppo-
site extreme, with many states opening the practice of law to wider and wider
segments of the population. Many states abolished educational requirements,
and a few even opened up the legal profession to the entire voting population. 1
Dubbing this period the "era of decadence," Pound decries it for treating the
practice of law not "as a profession, with requirements for admission such as
public policy may prescribe, but as a mere private, money-making occupa-
tion."" Advertising and solicitation were open and commonplace. Attorneys,
particularly young lawyers seeking to establish themselves, frequently advertised
15. See Radin, supra note ii, at 72.
16. See ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER: FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 98-111
(1953).
17. Id. at 138.
18. Id. at 142.
19. Id. at 143.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 231 ("After 1842 every citizen over twenty-one years of age in New
Hampshire, every citizen of Maine after 1843, every resident of Wisconsin after
1849, every voter in Indiana after 1851, might practice law without more." (cita-
tions omitted)).
22. Id. at 232.
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in handbills and newspapers. Abraham Lincoln was known to have advertised
in the 1830s and 1850s.24 Even the Alabama Bar Association, in 1887, allowed for
limited advertising, though it distinguished this from direct solicitation of
particular individuals to become clients. Pound's reaction to this period is as
derisive as his condemnation of the colonial era: "The harm which this depro-
fessionalizing of the practice of law did to the law, to legal procedure, to the
ethics of practice and to forensic conduct has outlived the era in which it took
place and still presents problems to the promoters of more effective administra-
tion of justice."26 Sadly, the former Harvard Law School dean provides no spe-
cifics on what this harm entailed.
Eventually, with the rise of bar associations in the late nineteenth century,
attorneys became subject to increased professional requirements. Likely moti-
vated by the economic pressures caused by the expansion of the profession,
the ABA and state bar associations pressured law schools to adopt new academ-
ic requirements, such as a high school education."8 Such educational prerequi-
sites favored native-born, Anglo-Saxon Protestant members of the bar and their
similarly situated clients.2 9 Yet it was not until 1908 that the ABA published its
Code of Professional Ethics.3 0 Spurred by a 1905 speech by President Theodore
Roosevelt rebuking corporate attorneys for aiding their clients' illegality, ABA
president Henry St. George Tucker demanded an inquiry into whether "the
ethics of our profession rise to the high standards which its position of influ-
ence in the country demands."3 The result was thirty-two ethical Canons that
23. See, e.g., Hornsby, supra note 9, at 262 ("A story from the Staunton (VA) Eagle
newspaper, which was published during much of the 18oos, indicates that a lawyer
included an announcement for his services in 1809. A thirty-one-year-old lawyer,
who went on to become a prosecutor and state senator, took out an ad announc-
ing his office.").
24. See id.
25. See id. at 280.
26. POUND, supra note 16, at 232.
27. Between 1850 and the beginning of the twentieth century, the number of lawyers
more than quintupled, from 22,000 to 114,ooo. Hornsby, supra note 9, at 280.
28. See ALBERT J. HARNO, LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 86-87 (2004).
29. At least one historian contends this favoritism was conscious and intentional. See
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 3 (1990); see also
Laura I. Appleman, The Rise of the Modern American Law School: How Professio-
nalization, German Scholarship, and Legal Reform Shaped Our System of Legal Edu-
cation, 39 NEW ENG. L. REV. 251, 271 (2005) ("Harvard Law School[] strongly op-
posed the official licensing of a school that catered to Catholics and the working
class.").
30. ABA, CANONS OF PROF'L ETHICS (1908).
31. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE: LAWYERS AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN
MODERN AMERICA 40 (1976).
608
29: 603 2011
IN DEFENSE OF AMBULANCE CHASING
sought to guarantee that "the conduct and the motives of the members of [the]
profession are such as to merit the approval of all just men."32
However, though President Roosevelt's address excoriated those lawyers
who represented America's ruling class, the 1908 Canons took aim at a different
target: The legal profession's most prominent leaders deplored those lawyers
who, in their "eager quest for lucre," subverted the practice's noble, nonpecu-
niary interests 33- in other words, the ambulance chasers. In developing the
Canons, the ABA relied heavily upon George Sharswood's Essay on Professional
Ethics, which had been published over fifty years earlier.3 4 Indeed, the introduc-
tory material to the 1908 Canons quotes Sharswood before any other source,
including Chief Justice Edward G. Ryan of the Wisconsin Supreme Court or
even Abraham Lincoln." Yet by the twentieth century, Sharswood's moralistic
prescriptions were sorely antiquated. Sharswood denounced the "horde of
pettifogging, barratrous, money-making lawyers" and recapitulated the distinc-
tion between professional legal practice and a base trade.36 Eschewing the active
pursuit of fame and fortune, Sharswood's ethical archetype passively acquired
business on the strength of his sterling reputation. Invoking these same prin-
ciples, the ABA constructed Canon 27, which proscribed solicitation of busi-
ness, both directly and indirectly (note the emphasis on honor and professio-
nalism):
[T]rust .... cannot be forced, but must be the outcome of character
and conduct . . . . [S]olicitation of business by circulars or advertisements,
or by personal communications or interviews, not warranted by personal
relations, is unprofessional.... Indirect advertisement for business by
furnishing or inspiring newspaper comments concerning causes in
which the lawyer has been or is engaged, or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interests involved, the importance
of the lawyer's positions, and all other like self-laudation defy the tradi-
tions, and lower the tone of our high calling, and are intolerable.3 7
Canon 28 likewise prohibited the related offense of stirring up litigation and
closely mirrors rules against barratry. Once again, the emphasis is on honor and
reputation over a concern for clients:
It is unprofessional for a lawyer to volunteer advice to bring a lawsuit,
except in rare cases where ties of blood, relationship or trust make it his
duty to do so. Stirring up strife and litigation is not only unprofessional,
but it is indictable at common law. It is disreputable to hunt up defects in
32. ABA, supra note 30, pmbl.
33. 29 A.B.A. REP. 601-02 (1906).
34. See AUERBACH, supra note 31, at 41; see also Hornsby, supra note 9, at 255.
35. See ABA, supra note 30, at 2.
36. AUERBACH, supra note 31, at 41-42.
37. ABA, supra note 30, Canon 27 (emphases added).
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titles or other causes of action and inform thereof in order to be
employed to bring suit, or to breed litigation by seeking out those with
claims for personal injuries or those having any other grounds of action in
order to secure them as clients .... .
Some combination of selfish intent and elitist ignorance had fueled a
regressive and anticompetitive restriction. Upholding such standards may have
proved practicable in Sharswood's time, where "a young nineteenth-century
attorney in a homogeneous small town, apprenticed to an established practi-
tioner, known in his community, and without many competitors" could open
up shop without serious economic risk, but "[iit could hardly reassure his
twentieth-century counterpart, the new-immigrant neophyte in a large city
where restricted firms monopolized the most lucrative business and thousands
of attorneys scrambled for a share of the remainder.... He either hustled or
starved."3 9 Contingent fees were similarly denounced by Sharswood and treated
suspiciously in the Canons. 40 Such fees allegedly demeaned the practice of law
by treating the profession as a business, though their limitation most harshly
affected the poor, who otherwise lacked the finances to entice an attorney to
take their cases. 41 Indeed, were the Canons' goal to protect vulnerable clients
against unscrupulous lawyers, they should probably have favored contingent
fees, since they align attorneys' interests with those of their clients.42 Yet while
the profession's views on contingent fees evolved over the past century, bar as-
sociations continued to direct antipathy toward advertisement and solicitation
of all kinds.
Until the Supreme Court began carving out exceptions to direct solicitation
in the 1970s, the states adhered to the Canons' prohibition on direct solicita-
tion.43 Of course, bar associations never categorically rejected the permissibility
of soliciting clients, despite the strong language of the Canons. For example, it
remained permissible for attorneys to advertise in bar directories and law lists,
38. Id. Canon 28 (emphases added).
39. AUERBACH, supra note 31, at 42.
40. See ABA, supra note 30, Canon 13; AUERBACH, supra note 31, at 42-47.
41. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross, We Could Pass a Law ... What Might Happen if Contin-
gent Legal Fees Were Banned, 47 DEPAUL L. REV. 321, 342 (1998) (noting that with-
out contingent fees, poor clients would be unable to afford legal representation in
order to successfully prosecute a legitimate claim). Interestingly, contingent fees
also serve a filtering function. Because a lawyer's prospects for payment are
dependent on the client's probability of success, each lawyer has the incentive to
accept meritorious cases and reject unmeritorious ones. See id. Ironically, then,
the old bar's opposition to contingent fees may in some ways conflict with the
"stirring up litigation" rationale underlying its antipathy toward direct solicita-
tion.
42. See Comment, supra note io, at 679.
43. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 255 ni.
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which catered to corporate lawyers and their clients, but not on television or in
print, which appealed to personal injury attorneys.44 Nor was the Atlanta Bar
Association accused of impropriety when, during the Great Depression, it hired
a public relations firm to create stories of the negative repercussions of do-it-
yourself lawyering that were then sent to businesses known to be in need of
legal representation.45 During the same period, the ABA also lauded the efforts
of the "Liberty League," which solicited suits against the National Labor Rela-
tions Board.46
While the powerful exempted themselves from the reach of the Canons,
individuals and organizations representing America's underclasses faced de-
nunciations and sanctions for stirring up litigation. The NAACP, for example,
was a frequent target of charges of barratry and solicitation of clients in breach
of state ethics requirements. 4 7 Meanwhile, the courts that considered solicita-
tion cases echoed the sentiments of previous eras, grounding the prohibition in
inchoate professionalism values. Such courts employed harsh language, but not
out of concern for protecting vulnerable clients. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n
v. Berezniak 8 is demonstrative. Berezniak, an immigrant from Russia (the court
was sure to note this fact), had advertised his services, to which the court grave-
ly declared: "An attorney who stirs up or secures litigation ... ought to be
disbarred. Any conduct of an attorney at law that necessarily tends to bring dis-
credit upon his profession and upon the courts is an abuse of the privilege secured
to him by his license." 49 Likewise, in In re Greathouse, though the court
acknowledged that the defendant attorney had faithfully served his largely indi-
gent clients to their satisfaction, 0 it lamented, "The practice of 'ambulance
chasing' . . . . lowers the tone of the profession. Lawyers who indulge in these
practices ... bring disrepute upon the administration of the law."" Surprisingly,
the Greathouse court even provides an explicitly anticompetitive rationale for
the proscriptions against solicitation, lambasting lawyers who used advertising
44. See id. at 284.
45. See id. at 264.
46. See Note, supra note 13, at 1188-89 n.62.
47. See, e.g., ROBYN DUFF LADINO, DESEGREGATING TEXAS SCHOOLS: EISENHOWER,
SHIVERS, AND THE CRISIS AT MANSFIELD HIGH 134 (1996); Susan D. Carle, Race,
Class, and Legal Ethics in the Early NAACP (1910-1920), LAW & HiST. REV., Jan. 15,
2002, at 97; see also Note, supra note 13, at 1189 ("[O]ne suspects that an unvoiced
reason for the animus against stirring up litigation is the fear that some of the liti-
gation stirred up will involve socially unpopular causes-such as suits attacking
segregation or those brought by tenants against landlords or consumers against
corporations.").
48. 127 N.E. 36 (Ill. 1920).
49. Id. at 39 (emphasis added).
50. In re Greathouse, 248 N.W. 735, 736 (Minn. 1933).
51. Id. at 737 (quotations and citations omitted).
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to invade "territory that geographically belongs to local attorneys. Such conduct
violates the elementary standards of fair play."" The court even condemned the
increased competition for reducing attorneys' fees.53 Bar association regulations
limited even the most innocuous forms of advertising; in 1963, for example, the
ABA banned holiday cards that identified the sender as a law firm or an attor-
ney in any way.54
Over the course of history, opponents of client solicitation have offered
diverse rationales for prohibiting the practice. In the Middle Ages, many
worried that solicitation would stir up unwanted litigation; the Progressive era
focused on the importance of professionalism and vocational purity; and in the
twentieth century, courts openly lamented that solicitation might foment
competition and reduce the price of legal services. Notably, what appears to be
missing from all of these accounts is a concern for the interests of prospective
clients-a rationale that only became prominent late in the twentieth century.
II. MODERN LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS
It would be decades before the Supreme Court would finally extend some
protection to attorney efforts to solicit clients. By the 1970s, the all-out ban on
52. Id. at 740.
53. See id.
54. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 264 (citing ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof'1
Responsibility, Formal Op. 309 (1963)).
55. See infra Part II. Cases from the twentieth century do exist in which the court
expresses some concern for the wellbeing of prospective clients. See, e.g., Hilde-
brand v. State Bar of Cal., 225 P.2d 508, 519 (Cal. 1950) (complaining that direct
solicitation included 'visits to homes and hospitals to procure retainers at
unseemly hours, and when the injured person or the members of his family were
in no mental condition to enter into contracts for the engagement of lawyer's ser-
vices"' (quoting In re Gondelman, 233 N.Y.S. 343, 346 (N.Y. App. Div. 1929))).
However, such cases often focus more heavily on the inherently unscrupulous na-
ture of lawyers who would stoop to soliciting clients rather than the vulnerability
of the prospective client. See, e.g., id. (complaining of "'the use of photographs of
checks of amounts of recoveries had, and newspaper clippings showing successes
in court, for the purpose of procuring clients"' (quoting Gondelman, 233 N.Y.S. at
346)); Morris v. Pa. R.R. Co., 134 N.E.2d 21, 27 (Ill. 1950) ("[T]he [ambulance]
chaser is basically dishonest when soliciting a client. He is interested primarily in
getting a contract signed, thus virtually assuring himself of a one-third cut of any
settlement figure or jury verdict. To get the contract the chaser often vastly exag-
gerates the worth of a claim, playing subtly on emotions of greed and avarice, as-
suring the injured person that his services will net a handsome figure. Actually,
the chaser is well aware of the true value of a case, and in settlement negotiations
will often agree to a figure little higher than the injured might have obtained by
direct negotiation." (quoting Comment, Settlement of Personal Injury Cases in the
Chicago Area, 47 Nw. U. L. REV. 895, 904 (1953))).
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solicitation of clients began to break down in light of new law firm models.
Firms like Jacoby & Meyers in Los Angeles, founded in 1972 as a "legal clinic"
rather than a traditional law firm, standardized fees and basic services in order
to serve a lower-income clientele than traditional firms." Despite historical
antipathy toward treating legal practice as a "business," such firms overtly
embraced the notion that they ran like businesses. Because these firms
depended on high client volume to remain profitable, they especially stood to
gain from advertising. As a result, firms began to violate the rules both openly"
and through subterfuge. 9 Particularly after the Supreme Court's recognition of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech," the climate was ripe for
constitutional challenge. By the time the Court finally considered the constitu-
tionality of solicitation restrictions in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,6 ten similar
cases were pending in the judicial system.
56. See About Southern California Office, JACOBY & MEYERS LAW OFFICES, http://
www.jacobymeyers.com/southern-california-office.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2011)
[hereinafter JACOBY & MEYERS].
57. See id. ("[I]f law firms would implement the efficiencies of a well run business,
they would be able to serve more clients at lower cost without sacrificing quali-
ty.").
58. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 354 (1976) (noting that "[b]ecause
appellants set their prices so as to have a relatively low return on each case they
handled, they depended on substantial volume," and therefore advertised services
and their associated fees in newspaper ads).
59. Jacoby & Meyers utilized press conferences and interviews to obtain free publicity
for their firm and its unique business model. See JACOBY & MEYERS, supra note 56.
6o. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
61. Bates, 433 U.S. at 350.
62. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 264-65 n.44 ("[I]n addition to Bates, Cairo v. State
Bar of Wisconsin (unreported) challenged Wisconsin's rules, which were identical
to the ABA Disciplinary Rules; Consumer Union of United States v. ABA, 470 F.
Supp. 1055 (E.D. Va. 1979), involved a suit by the Consumer Union to obtain ABA
review of a legal directory; Consumers Union v. State Bar of Cal. (unreported)
challenged the California rules and alleged that consumers were unable to find
lawyers at affordable fees; Hirschkop v. Va. State Bar, 604 F.2d 840 (4th Cir. 1979),
challenged the Virginia rules and was stayed pending a decision in Bates; Jacoby v.
The State Bar of Cal., 562 P.2d 1326 (Cal. 1977), sought review of a disciplinary
matter stemming from an open house of their legal clinic; Marine v. State Bar of
Wis. (unreported) was a First Amendment challenge that resulted after the attor-
ney was disciplined for advertising in several newspapers for his family law servic-
es; Niles v. Lowe, 407 F. Supp. 132 (D. Haw. 1976), resulted from a student news-
paper running ads about lawyers who were giving free advice and consultation to
students and faculty of a community college even though the lawyer had
instructed the newspaper to avoid publicity and was unaware of the content of the
ads before they ran; Person v. Ass'n of the Bar of New York, 554 F.2d 534 (2d Cir.
1977), involved a lawyer who sought to advertise in the yellow pages and in news-
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In Bates, the Supreme Court considered and rejected each of the arguments
advanced on behalf of a blanket ban on attorney advertising. The first rationale
considered was professionalism, but this time, the state bar had clothed it in a
veil of altruism: "Advertising is ... said to erode the client's trust in his attor-
ney: Once the client perceives that the lawyer is motivated by profit, his confi-
dence that the attorney is acting out of a commitment to the client's welfare is
jeopardized."63 Rebutting this assertion with actual data, the majority noted that
many citizens with valid claims who fail to obtain legal representation do so not
because of some distrust due to lack of professionalism, but because of a lack of
information about locating an attorney or the price of her services.> The Court
also dismissed the age-old "stirring up litigation" argument, noting the obvious
response that "we cannot accept the notion that it is always better for a person
to suffer a wrong silently than to redress it by legal action."" Indeed, the ma-
jority cited the ABA as claiming that the middle seventy percent of the popula-
tion had inadequate access to proper legal representation.66
Interestingly, the state bar of Arizona had also grounded its prohibition on
a concern for protecting clients from being defrauded by misleading advertise-
ments-not the historical basis for the rule, but perhaps a more attractive one.
The argument is as follows: Because legal services are too individualized to par-
ticular clients' cases to allow for uniform comparison, and clients lack the train-
ing required to determine the precise legal services they require, any advertise-
ment will prove inherently misleading.6 The majority responded by contesting
both the premise and the conclusion. First of all, some legal transactions (un-
contested divorces, simple adoptions, and so forth) do allow for standardiza-
tion, and the lawyers most likely to advertise price are those engaged in precise-
ly such services.68 Even if the information a lawyer provides through her
advertisements is somehow incomplete, the Court reasoned, it is irrational to
deprive a potential client of any information at all.69 It would seem that com-
plete ignorance is unlikely to enhance a client's bargaining position or guaran-
tee that he receive a fair price for competent representation.
papers; United States v. Am. Bar Ass'n, 135 F. Supp 2d 28, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) was an
antitrust action brought by the Department of Justice; and Legal Ethics League v.
N.C. State Bar, 624 F.2d 1094 (4th Cir. 1980), was a challenge brought by a lawyer
who had placed a classified ad in the Charlotte News and Observer.").
63. Bates, 433 U.S. at 368.
64. See id. at 370.
65. Id. at 375-76.
66. See id. at 376.
67. See id. at 372.
68. See id. at 372-73.
69. See id. at 374.
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It should be noted, of course, that even if the state bar was correct to dispa-
rage legal advertisements as misleading, the same reasoning is inapplicable to
direct solicitation. Interpersonal solicitations, particularly those targeted at
potential clients known to have suffered legitimate grievances, enable attorneys
to tailor their advice to specific clients and evade one-size-fits-all lawyering
altogether. Therefore, to the extent that their original analysis holds against
mass advertising, it cuts in favor of direct solicitation.
Bates was the first in a series of cases over two decades that liberalized the
profession's ethical strictures against client solicitation. The Supreme Court
extended protection to non-misleading mailings pertaining to lawyer qualifica-
tions (such as admission to the Supreme Court Bar), 70 the use of "commercial
illustrations" in legal advertising,7 ' and even mail solicitations to potential
clients.72 Of its own accord, the ABA House of Delegates amended its Model
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1978 to allow television advertising,
which was regarded as more invasive than print advertising (perhaps not coin-
cidentally, the Department of Justice a month later dropped an antitrust case it
had been pursuing against the ABA). 73
Reformers' steady success in the Supreme Court did not extend, however,
to direct solicitation. In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,74 the Court unanimous-
ly refused to extend Bates to direct solicitation of clients. While acknowledging
that the rule originated in values of professionalism, both the state bar and the
majority opinion shifted the focus almost entirely to shielding the client from
deceptive or coercive influence. The bar cited three related justifications in de-
fense of its disciplinary action, contending that the ban on solicitation would
help " [i] serve to reduce the likelihood of overreaching and the exertion of un-
due influence on lay persons, [2] to protect the privacy of individuals, and [3] to
avoid situations where the lawyer's exercise of judgment on behalf of the client
will be clouded by his own pecuniary self-interest."76 Of these, the Court placed
greatest emphasis on the first, warning that "in-person solicitation may exert
pressure and often demands an immediate response, without providing an op-
portunity for comparison or reflection."77 The Court also gave some weight to
70. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 206 (1982).
71. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985).
72. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988).
73. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 284-85.
74. 436 U.S. 447, 448-49 (1978). Justice Powell, himself a former President of the ABA,
wrote the opinion.
75. See id. at 460.
76. Id. at 461.
77. Id. at 457.
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concerns that uninvited solicitations might "distress" a potential client simply
in virtue of their obtrusiveness.7
Notably, the Court confronted similar issues in Edenfield v. Fane but
reached the opposite result.7 9 There the Court refused to extend the reasoning
of Ohralik, which sustained the prohibition on direct solicitation conducted by
lawyers, to similar conduct by accountants. The majority reasoned that, though
accountants are also skilled professionals, the training of a CPA "emphasizes
independence and objectivity, not advocacy."so Such logic concedes much to
the opponents of Ohralik, effectively jettisoning two of Ohralik's three ratio-
nales-respect for client privacy and perverse financial incentives. Those lack-
ing in advocacy skills can intrude on potential clients' privacy as much as those
with training-perhaps even more so. Similarly, a professional accountant (or
engineer, financial adviser, etc.) engaged in direct client solicitation seems no
less likely to have her good judgment clouded by pecuniary interests than a
professional attorney would simply because the latter enjoys greater skills of
persuasion. At that point, all that is left is the Court's concern for deterring law-
yers from exerting undue influence on laypersons. Indeed, some commentators
regard Ohralik as an aberration altogether: "[O]utside of Ohralik and a few
cases from the 198os that are now widely considered overruled, the Court has
not sustained any other general ban on advertising under the commercial
speech doctrine.""1 In the end, perhaps all that can be done to distinguish Ohra-
lik from Edenfield is to note that, in the fifteen years between the two cases, the
Court's composition had changed.82
In 1995, the Supreme Court decided Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc.," in
which a divided Court upheld the state bar's limitation on direct mail solicita-
tions within thirty days of an accident or disaster. In reaching its decision, the
Court deftly shifted between the "invasion of privacy" rationale that had been
irrelevant to its decision in Edenfield and a concern for professionalism, which
had proved unpersuasive in Bates: "[The Bar's study] contains data-both statis-
78. See id. at 465-66.
79. 507 U.S. 761 (1993).
80. Id. at 775.
81. Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests of the Legal
Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 474 (2008); see also Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
Intersection of Free Speech and the Legal Profession: Constraints on Lawyers' First
Amendment Rights, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 569, 579 (1998) ("[T]he difference in out-
comes [in Ohralik and Edenfield] turned solely on broad generalizations about the
professional attributes of lawyers and accountants.").
82. The Edenfield Court included three Justices who had participated in deciding
Ohralik: Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Stevens and Blackmun. However, all
had voted with the majority in Chralik. Compare Edenfield, 507 U.S. at 762, with
Ohralik v. Ohio Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 447 (1978).
83. 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
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tical and anecdotal-supporting the Bar's contentions that the Florida public
views direct-mail solicitations in the immediate wake of accidents as an intru-
sion on privacy that reflects poorly upon the profession."14 Privacy concerns, the
Court argued, distinguished the case from Shapero." Yet only a few paragraphs
later, the majority appears to backslide from this position and eschew the
import of client privacy:
The purpose of the 30-day targeted direct-mail ban is to forestall the
outrage and irritation with the state-licensed legal profession that the
practice of direct solicitation only days after accidents has engendered.
The Bar is concerned not with citizens' "offense" in the abstract,...
but with the demonstrable detrimental effects that such "offense" has
on the profession it regulates.86
Unlike the historical origins of the regulation, Florida Bar's brand of "profes-
sionalism" was grounded more in public relations than gentlemanly values, but
just like the original version, the focus was protecting the profession, not its
consumers. 8 In any case, none of the various theories advanced against lawyer
advertising and solicitation was grounded in empirical evidence, a fact some
critics have used to indict these ethical strictures as nothing more than a rent-
seeking masquerade."
The ABA currently justifies Model Rule 7.3 on the same grounds upon
which the Ohralik Court relied in its decision. In its commentary on the regula-
tion, the ABA writes that "in-person, live telephone or real-time electronic con-
tact by a lawyer with a prospective client known to need legal services . . . . sub-
ject[s] the layperson to the private importuning of the trained advocate in a
direct interpersonal encounter," which could result in a situation "fraught with
the possibility of undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching."9 The ABA
had conceded by the mid-nineties that, contrary to the majority opinion in
Florida Bar, lawyer advertising had little to do with negative public perception
of the profession, though state bar associations have continued to almost
84. Id. at 626.
85. See id. at 629.
86. Id. at 631.
87. See Barton, supra note 81, at 476-77 ("While it is true that Ohralik relied on two
separate justifications (protecting privacy and potential to mislead), later cases
had generally treated Ohralik as a high potential for deception case and not a
privacy case. By contrast, Wentfor It includes no allegation that the advertising at
issue was actually or even potentially false or misleading. Instead, the biggest
problem seems to be the effect upon the public perception of lawyers.").
88. See Lloyd B. Snyder, Rhetoric, Evidence, and Bar Agency Restrictions on Speech by
Attorneys, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 357 (1995).
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt.1 (2000).
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universally favor increased restrictions on attorney advertising and direct solici-
tation.9o
Thus, the rule we have today legitimates itself as a defense against attorney
manipulation of vulnerable laypersons. As explained in Part I, this justification
runs contrary to the origins of anti-solicitation rules in Anglo-American legal
history. Even in fairly modern terms, however, the case law has often treated
attorney manipulation as a secondary concern, instead relying on arguments
ranging from respect for client privacy to the inherently misleading nature of
attorney advertising to various versions of the professionalism rationale.
Consequently, even if protecting prospective clients from deception plays a
crucial role in justifying the current rule, its pedigree is limited.
III. DIRECT SOLICITATION: THE FINAL RELIC
The legal profession no longer prohibits lawyers from indirectly soliciting
clients through either mass advertisement or targeted9' mailings. Nevertheless,
even those who called for liberalization of the old system generally expressed
reluctance at permitting direct solicitation.92 I contend that this is a distinction
without a difference. Not only do many of the same reasons for permitting indi-
rect solicitation also hold true for direct solicitation, but allowing the one and
not the other creates asymmetries that result in inefficiency and inequity.
This Part attacks the current ban on direct solicitation on several fronts. In
the first Section, I critique the exceptions to Model Rule 7.3 as unwarranted and
crafted to favor certain segments of the bar. Section B then analyzes client vul-
nerability and concludes that direct solicitation actually serves the needs of
clients who might otherwise be susceptible to manipulation. In Section C, I
proceed to some of Model Rule 7.3's asymmetric effects on lawyers' pursuit of
clients. I argue that, in the absence of direct solicitation, prospective clients will
often have insufficient information to properly assess the quality of lawyers, and
a market failure results. Section D explains some of the ban's negative effects
within the profession and explores the idea that Model Rule 7.3 enables
rent-seeking.
A. Critiquing the Exceptions
Model Rule 7.3 provides three exceptions to its prohibition on direct solici-
tation. According to the ABA, a lawyer may directly solicit a third party if: (1)
the solicited party is a lawyer; (2) the solicited party "has a family, close person-
go. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 289-90.
91. A targeted mailing might, for example, involve a letter sent by an attorney "to
potential clients who have had a foreclosure suit filed against them." See Shapero
v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466, 469 (1988).
92. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 1199 (arguing that not only fraudulent solicitation
but "improper" solicitation ought also to remain prohibited).
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al, or prior professional relationship with the lawyer;" or (3) it is not the case
that "a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary
gain." 93 Given that the ABA predicates Rule 7.3 on the potential client's vulne-
rability, which Ohralik posited as arising from the lawyer's "train [ing] in the art
of persuasion," 94 the first exception is natural. However, if Model Rule 7.3's
primary goal is preventing the manipulation of vulnerable laypersons, both the
second and third exceptions appear oddly calculated to achieve this end.
At best, the exception for direct solicitation of personal contacts is unwar-
ranted. Without explanation, Model Rule 7.3's commentary proclaims, "There
is far less likelihood that a lawyer would engage in abusive practices against an
individual who is a former client, or with whom the lawyer has close personal
or family relationship."95 Perhaps pangs of guilt from abusing the trust of a
friend, relative, or close professional contact would deter a lawyer who has a
preexisting relationship with his client, but while the likelihood of manipulation
in the context of preexisting relationships might be lower, the susceptibility of a
potential client to abuse in such circumstances would almost certainly be great-
er. Lawyers in such cases will have already gained the trust of the potential
client, who is therefore less likely to be on guard against unfair dealing or as
willing to shop around for a superior alternative.96
At its worst, though, the preexisting relationships exception may simply
constitute a form of rent-seeking by more elite or better established attorneys. A
corporate lawyer is more likely to have friends and family involved in the sorts
of enterprises that require attorneys for day-to-day business. Those who occupy
society's lower rungs are the least likely to have an informal relationship with an
attorney.97 Members of the upper bar, because of the circles in which they travel
(e.g., the country club, Ivy League school, nonprofit board of directors), are also
better able to leverage their social contacts and professional relationships into
steady business.9' Even in the context of less prestigious segments of the profes-
sion, the exception favors established members of the bar over newcomers.
Veteran attorneys may openly solicit their former clients while novices must
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2000).
94. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978).
95. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt.3 (2000).
96. Perhaps also underlying this exception is the belief that lawyers with preexisting
relationships with their clients are less likely to deal unfairly or suffer from inepti-
tude. If so, it is entirely unclear whether such a belief is justifiable. Even "shysters"
develop relationships-indeed, some clients may prefer the services of a less-than-
scrupulous attorney!
97. Though it is quite possible that the poor are more likely to have formal interac-
tions with lawyers than are middle class citizens. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433
U.S. 350, 376 (1976).
98. See id. at 378.
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rely on a reputation they have not yet earned or general advertisements they
may be unable to afford.
Perhaps this exception, rather than presuming a working relationship that
involves a stronger foundation for trust, is instead grounded in social expecta-
tions. In circumstances in which a family member or former client is in need of
legal assistance, social mores and natural human sentiment may make it nearly
impossible for an attorney to fail to offer her services (at a reasonable fee, of
course). At least to the extent that client vulnerability is the actual basis for the
prohibition, this rationale cannot justify the exception on its own. After all, an
attorney's fear of social awkwardness or commitment to remedying injustice
renders potential clients no less vulnerable to manipulation.
Model Rule 7.3's third exception, which allows lawyers to directly solicit
clients for reasons other than pecuniary gain, also seems ill-suited to protect
clients from manipulation. It is questionable whether a public interest lawyer
zealously committed to the justice of her cause is less likely to strong-arm a po-
tential client than the run-of-the-mill solo practitioner looking to make a living
for himself. For example, public interest firms seeking to advance certain tran-
scendent values may exert soft pressure on potential clients, effectively "guilt-
ing" them into accepting legal representation; even a client who is satisfied with
his family lawyer may be loath to reject representation from an ACLU lawyer
promising to advance the cause of civil liberties. Moreover, once an attorney-
client relationship has been established, the for-profit lawyer's interests may
prove better aligned with his client's than those of the public interest lawyer.
Because the former is paid by his client-or, in the case of contingent fees, has a
direct stake in his client's success-he has a vested interest in serving the client's
needs.99 Public interest firms, particularly those committed to an impact litiga-
tion agenda, may have a more global perspective that could conflict with the
needs of a particular client-for example, forgoing a novel argument on appeal
in one case so as to use it in another case with better prospects of success.'
Likewise, a pro bono attorney may seek press attention for his case or for him-
self-an incentive that often diverges with the needs of the client, who may best
be served through quick and quiet settlement. 0 ' In some cases, free legal clinics
with no ulterior motives may even worsen client outcomes.0 2 Economic
interests may lack moral content, but they can be effective motivators.
99. See, e.g., Note, supra note 13, at 1187-88.
ioo. See CYNDI BANKS, CRIMINAL JUSTICE ETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 110 (2d ed.
2009).
ioi. See Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain: The Enigma of Impermissible Solici-
tation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 417 (1991).
102. See D. James Greiner & Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, What Difference Representa-
tion? Offers, Actual Use, and the Need for Randomization, 121 YALE L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2011) (describing how the provision of free legal services by a Harvard Law
School clinic was found not to improve success rates while simultaneously delay-
ing resolution of valid claims).
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B. Client Vulnerability
Critics are correct that attorneys who directly solicit clients are likely to
focus on those they know to be in need of legal representation and that such in-
dividuals are vulnerable. That is precisely why the potential clients need legal
representation. In many cases, quick and decisive action is necessary in order to
apprise an individual of her rights, contact witnesses, or preserve crucial
evidence for trial.10 3 By the time an aggrieved party gets around to obtaining a
lawyer, the window for action on many of these matters may already have
closed-particularly when sophisticated adversaries may already be acting.10 4
Many people, particularly the less well-educated, may not even be aware that
they have a viable legal claim or are at risk of liability. Direct solicitation notifies
potential clients of these rights and interests, even when the individual ultimate-
ly decides not to hire the soliciting attorney. Such preliminary contacts may
even apprise potential clients of the correct questions to ask and qualities to
look for if they ultimately do decide to retain legal counsel. Viewing a general
advertisement on television or in a newspaper may mitigate this education defi-
cit, but because such information is sporadic and general, it is less likely to be
useful when an individual becomes involved in an actual legal matter.
These problems are exacerbated because no restriction exists for direct
contacts from parties whose interests may diverge from the potential client's.
Nothing prevents contacts from insurance companies, opposing counsel, or
private investigators, all of whom are free to gather evidence or make settlement
offers.o' Indeed, some insurance companies actively exploit this loophole, and
"advertise they can resolve accident claims the quickest, and they will visit
clients within 24 hours of an incident to attempt to gain a settlement."o' The
lawyers for these insurance companies generally enjoy more prestige and influ-
ence within the bar than do the personal injury attorneys who are barred from
directly soliciting clients.
Additionally, Model Rule 7.3 applies to all clients, regardless of the serious-
ness of their cases. This belies the fundamental premise of the rule: that lawyers
will direct their solicitations toward individuals who "feel overwhelmed by the
circumstances giving rise to the need for legal services."o0 The Supreme Court
considered a similar point in Florida Bar,"os holding that a thirty-day ban on
103. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
104. See infra discussion concerning contacts from adverse parties and insurance com-
panies.
105. See id.
1o6. See Stephanie Francis Ward, Ohio Won't Block Letters to Accident Victims, 5 No. 37
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT 3 (20o6).
107. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt.1 (2000).
108. 515 U.S. at 632-33.
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direct mailings to aggrieved individuals was not overinclusive for First Amend-
ment purposes, but there the majority grounded its decision more in a concern
for the profession and client privacy than attorney overreaching. It failed to
consider, however, why a person in need of legal counsel in some minor matter
would require blanket protection from all direct attorney contacts, regardless of
her state of mind.
C. Alternatives to Direct Solicitation
Direct solicitation is certainly capable of abuse by unethical attorneys, but
that is hardly the end of the story. Adverse selection may bias perceptions:
Because the only lawyers who currently engage in direct solicitation do so in
violation of ethical strictures and at the risk of sanction, it should come as no
surprise that unscrupulous lawyers abuse the practice disproportionately.o 9 Yet
even assuming that direct solicitation suffers from imperfections, the alternative
is not an ideal system in which competent lawyers passively await business from
perfectly informed clients. Lawyers will still seek clients even if ethical restric-
tions place limits on their ability to do so. A proper evaluation of the wisdom of
permitting direct solicitation thus requires a comparison with the alternative
options that exist.
1. Mass Advertising
Subsequent to Bates, the obvious alternative for lawyers who wish to attract
clients is mass advertising. True, the wealthier and better-educated segments of
society probably do not rely on park bench ads when choosing legal representa-
tion, but neither would they be likely to respond to direct solicitation. The low-
er and middle classes, however, have fewer options in evaluating lawyer quality
and may respond to those few informational cues they receive, even if the cues
are as imperfect as a commercial they see on television. The ban on direct solici-
tation, therefore, pushes these more vulnerable groups to depend more heavily
on general advertisements, and pushes the lawyers who serve this clientele to
utilize such ads more aggressively.
The legal system's asymmetrical preferencing of mass advertisement over
direct solicitation yields several harms. The first consequence is minor, though
relevant. Mass solicitations, because they cannot be targeted as direct solicita-
tions, primarily reach people who do not demand legal services. This scattershot
approach can prove vexing, particularly to the countless advertising recipients
whose time is wasted by the ads. Moreover, mass advertising also translates into
wasteful overhead costs for the lawyers who must rely on such advertising. In
response, lawyers have exhibited ingenuity in finding more effective ways to
advertise their services without technically violating Model Rule 7.3. For exam-
109. See Comment, supra note io, at 679. Consider this a variant of the old slogan: "If
guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns."
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ple, because of its high correlation with litigation, "mesothelioma" currently
stands as the keyword for which web search advertising space is most expen-
sive." The shift Model Rule 7.3 effectuates from direct solicitation to additional
mass advertising is almost certainly suboptimal.
In one respect, the ban on direct solicitation probably incentivizes excessive
advertising. Yet there is also reason to believe that some lawyers advertise insuf-
ficiently. The profession has traditionally derided lawyers who advertise as
"shysters" and regarded them with suspicion. This is due in part to the tradition
surrounding the role of the lawyer as gentleman. Chief Justice Warren Burger, a
particularly virulent critic of the Court's decision to extend First Amendment
protection to attorney advertising in Bates, as well as a decent bellwether for the
traditionalist's perspective, wrote of attorney advertising that "[a] part from a
handful of 'ambulance chasers,' only the shysters went further than sending a
business card to a potential client or joining the right clubs.""' Even after Bates
and the reformation of the Model Rules, the stereotype has stuck, discouraging
quality attorneys from tarnishing their reputations through advertising. This
forms a vicious cycle, as competent practitioners eschew advertising, thereby
reifying the stereotype they seek to avoid.
Direct solicitation sidesteps this perverse outcome whereby only lawyers of
the lowest quality tend to advertise and, therefore, are the only lawyers to whom
individuals with limited information resources have access. Although most, if
not all, of the negative associations applicable to advertising exist for direct soli-
citation as well, lawyers who employ direct solicitation can do so discretely. A
lawyer who purchases a cheesy television commercial risks forever branding
herself in the eyes of the public and the profession. Particularly in light of the
Internet's ability to memorialize long-regretted indiscretions, lawyer advertising
may often have permanent career implications."' This is not so in the case of
direct solicitations. The lawyer who directly solicits his clients circumscribes the
effects on his reputation. The solicitation may influence the impression of the
client and those close to him, but their eventual assessment of the attorney will
iio. See Mike Peters, Mesothelioma: The Usual Paid Searches Don't Apply, BKV
BLOG (June 2008), http://my.bkv.com/blog/comments/mesothelioma-the-most
-expensive-keyword/.
III. Warren E. Burger, Too Many Lawyers, Too Many Suits, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991,
at Ai (book review).
112. Admittedly, public access to general advertisements better encourages honest re-
presentations than direct solicitations, which, because of their bilateral nature,
may be denied more plausibly after the fact. Cf ROBERT FELDMAN, THE LIAR IN
YOUR LIFE: THE WAY TO TRUTHFUL RELATIONSHIPS 232 (2009) ("The Deterrent
Hypothesis holds that Internet users, aware of the digital record their interaction
generates, will be less likely to lie. The record and the possibility that it could be
checked later for accuracy will make people be more truthful than they'd be in a
casual, face-to-face interaction, which generally involves no permanent documen-
tation.").
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primarily depend on the quality of the legal services provided. Effective advo-
cates who seek to expand their clientele without diminishing their stature with-
in the profession may, therefore, be willing to resort to direct solicitation, even
in cases in which they are unwilling to advertise. Consequently, good lawyers
would be able to develop their practice while solicited clients would choose
from a more promising pool of legal advocates than they might have if they
were completely reliant on attorney advertising.
Encouraging mass advertisement facilitates one final harm to the adminis-
tration of justice: It asymmetrically favors larger legal practices that serve a
high-volume client base. Solo practitioners generally lack the economies of scale
necessary to exploit broad-based advertising. Advertising may prove inefficient
even for many larger firms, particularly those who serve smaller clienteles
because their practice requires focusing greater attention on individual cases.
On the other hand, legal service providers who specialize in routine work for a
less affluent consumer base depend on volume to remain profitable, since mar-
gins received from individual cases are small. For such firms, advertising makes
sense." 3 Therefore, the ABA's preference for advertising over direct solicitation
favors high-volume practices in two ways. On the demand end, advertising
provides a competitive advantage to existing firms, who already possess the
economies of scale to engage in advertising, in attracting clients. On the supply
end, it adds incentives-through increased business-to form firms centered
around the high-volume model.
Standardized, high-volume practices fill a crucial niche in the provision of
legal services, particularly to low-income clients,"14 but their comparative advan-
tage is generally limited to routine matters whose risk to the client is relatively
minor." The high-volume model is not best equipped to handle complex cases
requiring individualized attention or serious matters where minor errors could
have major repercussions."' Moreover, the incentives of a high-volume practice
may not align optimally with those of the client. Ceteris paribus, a law firm will
prefer to settle ten cases for $io,ooo each to settling one case for $90,ooo. A
smaller practice cannot expect the constant stream of clients a high-volume
firm enjoys. Accordingly, whereas the former must cautiously maximize the
value to be obtained from every single client, the latter may benefit from rush-
ing cases prematurely to settlement. Considering that persons of low income
113. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Russell G. Pearce & Jeffrey W. Stempel, Why Lawyers
Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1084, 1102 (1983).
114. See Note, supra note 13, at 1204-05 (arguing that advertising, by encouraging effi-
cient economies of scale and standardization, lowers prices and increases access to
legal services); see also supra Part II for a discussion of the advantages of large-
scale "legal clinics."
115. See Hazard, Pearce & Stempel, supra note 113, at 1091.
116. See id. at 1103.
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and education are the most likely to patronize high-volume law firms, such
perverse incentives encourage the unequal administration of justice across
society.
2. Unsolicited Attorney Hiring
In the absence of direct solicitation, individuals who elect not to hire an
attorney who advertises must rely on their own research when selecting a law-
yer. Unfortunately, unless the client has a prior professional relationship with
the attorney or knows someone who does, she has little basis upon which to
assess the attorney's proficiency. Because of their superior professional contacts,
this is a problem unlikely to afflict society's elite.1" Others seeking legal repre-
sentation, however, suffer from an information deficit. With no ability on the
part of consumers to evaluate the quality of legal services before their purchase,
the result is a classic case of market failure: No guarantee exists that parties will
enter into mutually beneficial transactions."' This information deficit can also
lead to some strange economic outcomes. For example, unable to judge a law-
yer's talents directly, consumers may instead utilize cognitive alternatives, such
as associating higher prices with a superior product. 9 It is not uncommon for
criminal defendants, for example, to prefer to retain counsel of an inferior
quality to the public defender on the assumption that free representation is
probably inferior representation. 2 0
Moreover, one of the central condemnations of direct solicitation-that it
pressures potential clients into employing an attorney before shopping
around-holds even stronger in the case of unsolicited attorney hiring. The
commentary to Model Rule 7.3 argues, "The prospective client, who may al-
ready feel overwhelmed by the circumstances giving rise to the need for legal
services, may find it difficult fully to evaluate all available alternatives with
reasoned judgment and appropriate self-interest in the face of the lawyer's pres-
ence and insistence upon being retained immediately."' ' Yet the ABA remains
unconcerned for the individual who has committed herself to seeking legal
117. It might be argued that, because of greater interaction with the legal system and
the education provided by legal aid services, the poor may be better situated in
finding an attorney than a blue-collar member of the middle class. See Bates v.
State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1976).
118. See generally WALTER J. WESSELS, ECONOmIcs 381-95 (4th ed. 2006).
119. The result is an upward-sloping demand curve. See ALAIN ANDERTON, ECONOM-
ics 68 (3d ed. 20o6).
120. Cf Richard A. Posner & Albert Yoon, What Judges Think of the Quality of Legal
Representation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 317, 320 (2011) (finding that judges rate the quali-
ty of representation provided by public defenders to be superior to that provided
by retained counsel or court-appointed counsel).
121. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3 cmt.1 (2000).
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counsel, who has contacted a lawyer, and who has traveled to his offices to
speak to him in person. Such surroundings are hardly conducive to effective
comparison-shopping.
Indeed, what the commentary to Model Rule 7.3 ignores is the possibility of
competition in direct solicitation. In many-maybe even most-cases, if one
attorney knows of a prospective client who needs legal representation, more will
learn as well. Despite the ABA's exhortations to the contrary, direct solicitation
is unlikely to match every client to a single unscrupulous lawyer, who then
fraudulently and coercively foists an inferior and costly service on the unsus-
pecting client. Rather, in cases sufficiently lucrative to merit direct solicitation,
several lawyers will likely compete over the client. The result of such competi-
tion would be to drive down price and provide incentive to verify the quality of
the service being offered. Competitors would have every incentive to catalogue
and expose the malfeasance of their unethical or incompetent rivals, driving
them out of the market. Client-initiated contacts are less likely to reap these
market efficiencies, especially since attorneys in such cases are unlikely to know
which other attorneys, if any, the client is contemplating hiring.
D. Unfairness to Lawyers
While the ABA's Model Rules of Professional Conduct rightly prioritize the
interests of the client, Model Rule 7.3 provides inequitable treatment to attor-
neys as well. A veteran attorney with a well-established reputation may passively
wait for clients to come through her door, but unless she already possesses pres-
tigious social connections, the newcomer cannot rely on word-of-mouth to
stimulate business. At that point, two likely options present themselves: either
advertise or avoid solo practice.
Advertising is the less likely of these two options for the obvious reason that
a new attorney probably lacks the initial capital needed to conduct an extensive
advertising campaign. Even assuming that advertising were an economically
viable option, it might not necessarily prove fruitful. Commercial advertise-
ments-particularly those intended to grab the audience's attention-
frequently emphasize huge cash settlements.122 Though individuals with merito-
rious claims may respond, such promises are well known in the profession to
attract frivolous suits from litigious malcontents and dishonest plaintiffs
seeking easy money.2 3 Large law firms have the resources to quickly identify
122. See, e.g., attorneylarryhparker, Headline (1986) - Attorney Larry H. Parker TV
Commercial, YouTUBE (Aug. 14, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=
zMnVmT8bRSE (showcasing a recent $2.1 million settlement as the highlight of
the ad); LegalAdFan, "I Am the Hammer, They Are the Nails" - Lowell Stanley,
YouTUBE (Feb. 22, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62xreSr25ul (adver-
tising a firm whose phone number is "459-CASH").
123. For this fact, I rely on my father's brief personal experience with legal advertising.
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and filter out the frivolous claims, but a solo practitioner may lack the means to
do so.
Alternatively, a new attorney seeking to establish a reputation will seek
employment in a group practice of some kind and come under the tutelage of
more experienced attorneys. Such a decision is not necessarily an imprudent
one; historically, those who studied law apprenticed themselves to a veteran and
oftentimes took over the practice after the latter's retirement. 12 4 Yet there is
reason to believe that Model Rule 7.3 artificially inflates the demand for this sort
of experience to a suboptimal level. By encouraging young attorneys to begin
their practice working in an institution like a law firm, fewer competitive
pressures exist in the legal market to keep costs low and quality of service high.
Were direct solicitation permitted, inexperienced attorneys could compete
through lower prices and a greater guarantee of attention to minor cases than
competitors could promise. Meanwhile, because such a system is a "buyer's
market" for the labor of inexperienced attorneys, the more senior lawyers hiring
new attorneys need not pay the latter the same level of compensation they
otherwise would, whether that compensation takes the form of a higher salary
or more meaningful work.
Though the impact of Model Rule 7.3 on the market for young lawyers may
not be its severest cost to society, it does suspiciously seem to advance the inter-
ests of the more established members of the bar. In fact, some very surprising
organizations have championed continued prohibition of direct client solicita-
tion in recent years. The Washington Legal Foundation, a public interest firm
whose goal is to "strengthen America's free enterprise system" through imple-
mentation of "free market principles," advocates for blanket bans on all
in-person or targeted solicitations, regardless of time frame.12 5 In Florida Bar,
the plaintiffs' bar submitted an amicus brief contending that advertising taints
the jury pool, which diminishes plaintiff success rates and dampens damage
awards.'"' More recently, in a debate in Ohio over whether to permit targeted
mail solicitations of recent accident victims, the Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers
supported a ban on similar grounds.2 7
Of course, anecdote and assertion-rather than data and reason-generally
bolster claims that solicitations tarnish the reputation of the profession, so as to
124. See, e.g., STEPHEN N. SUBRIN & MARGARET Y.K. Woo, LITIGATING IN AMERICA:
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT 29 (20o6) ("Lawyers were initially trained by the
apprentice method by which young lawyers studied and practiced under the tute-
lage of a more experienced lawyer.").
125. WLF Mission, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., http://www.wlf.org/org/mission.asp (last
visited Apr. 14, 2011); Memorandum from Wash. Legal Found. to Michael Co-
lodner, Esq., N.Y. Office of Court Admin. 3 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at http://
www.wlf.org/Upload/o9l2o6Inre-proposedNYrules.pdf.
126. See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 639 (1995).
127. See Ward, supra note 1o6.
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undermine the wheels of justice.128 Such a perspective is inherently elitist; pros-
pective clients themselves often work in businesses that advertise to attract
customers. 129 Although English barristers cannot actively solicit business for
themselves, they have long suffered from the same poor reputation as their
American counterparts.'30 Even if the hypothesized jury pool tainting effect had
some basis in reality, it seems that any of the reputational harms imposed by
direct solicitation would be negligible in light of the tacky and downright
embarrassing legal advertisements that already exist.'3 ' If anything, by allowing
lawyers to focus their attention on prospective clients, direct solicitation would
seem to quarantine such shady practitioners from general view. Professional or-
ganizations such as trial lawyers' groups generally represent the more senior
and experienced members of the bar.' One wonders, then, if their efforts to
curtail client solicitation are simply an attempt to guarantee themselves a bigger
slice of the pie-even if it shrinks for everyone else.'33 One Ohio attorney noted
that if lawyers who engage in direct solicitation "want to make a fool of them-
selves in front of the victim, we all have to suffer the consequences as a profes-
sion." 3 4 Notably, that attorney defends insurance companies for a living. No
ethical rule bars him from contacting accident victims on behalf of his client.
IV. STIRRING Up LITIGATION REVISITED
In Part III, I argued that the ABA's rationale of banning direct solicitation
in order to protect vulnerable clients is unwarranted. Indeed, it may even be a
smokescreen for advancing the private interests of the upper bar. Ironically, one
of the rule's historical bases-the idea that solicitation stirs up unwanted litiga-
128. Cf Snyder, supra note 88 (positing that the arguments against advertising and
solicitation are almost never supported with empirical data, which suggests that
such arguments actually serve ulterior motives). Snyder also claims that consum-
ers respond positively to advertisements, id. at 386, but, ironically, fails to provide
any data in support of this claim.
129. See Comment, supra note io, at 681.
130. See id.; see also WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE
SIXTH act 4, sc. 2 ("The first thing we do, let's kill all the lawyers.").
131. See, e.g., Michael Gallagher, Take My Wife Please... (Local Commercial), You-
TUBE (Dec 4, 2007), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8QjnoW4dIo&feature=
related ("I decided to hire Michael Gallagher as my attorney, and I ruined my
husband's New Year."); Steven Miller, Tackiest Lawyer Ad ... Ever, YouTUBE
(Dec. 13, 2008), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-yiQk6QPzulc ("If you and
your spouse hate each other like poison and want to get out of the hellhole you
call a marriage, you've come to the right place.").
132. See AUERBACH, supra note 31, at 42.
133. See Hornsby, supra note 9, at 292-93.
134. See Ward, supra note 1o6.
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tion-may be stronger than either its original proponents articulated or its
critics give it credit for. In this Part, I look to resuscitate the "stirring up litiga-
tion" rationale. However, while I contend that this reformulation is superior to
other defenses of Model Rule 7.3, I still conclude that society is better served
through abandonment of the prohibition on direct solicitation.
A. Litigation as Social Failure
Modern scholarship generally dismisses the claim that solicitation "stirs up
litigation" as antiquated and in opposition to the values of our system of
justice. 135 Essentially, such scholars contend that this view is an indictment of
the legal system as a whole. Insofar as we believe rights ought to be vindicated,
they argue, we ought to encourage injured parties to bring valid claims to
court.136
This undersells the point. The claim is not that litigation is never the best
choice, but rather, it is never a perfect choice. Invoking the legal system has its
costs. Though economic costs associated with litigation are significant (econo-
mists have estimated that the United States tort system alone costs 2.3% of
GDP-two and a half times the world average137), in some ways, these may be
less significant than the social costs involved. Resorting to litigation acknowl-
edges that civility and cooperation have broken down. Some scholarship has
concluded that much of the time, plaintiffs seek personal vindication that they
have been wronged rather than financial remuneration. Sometimes the tort
system is the only way to satisfy this psychological desire, but it can be counter-
therapeutic as well. Litigation involves lengthy delays, an imperfect commoditi-
zation of injuries, and, perhaps worst of all, rarely provides plaintiffs with
opportunities to deal with defendants face-to-face in order to "acknowledge
losses and responsibilities, settle their differences, and bring closure to the
case."'3' Life in a litigious society may have implications for American culture,
fomenting atomization and a tendency on the part of defendants to minimize
135. See Note, supra note 13, at 1188 ("The medieval notion that litigation is evil per se
has, however, been widely rejected, and it is now recognized that litigation often
serves vital social functions.").
136. See Radin, supra note 11, at 72 ("If it is well-founded, if a wrong has been done or
an obligation unfulfilled ... a law suit ought to be considered proper and com-
mendable."); Comment, supra note lo, at 676-77 ("[I]f individual rights be
emphasized and the theory be adopted that the function of the Courts is to
enforce all valid claims, then stirring up litigation must be considered a desirable
activity.").
137. John Kerr, Louis B. Kimmelman & William R. Squires, III, United States, in Eco-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF LITIGATION WORLDWIDE 407 (Charles Platto ed., 1998).
138. Edie Greene, "Can We Talk?" Therapeutic Jurisprudence, Restorative Justice, in
CIVIL JURIES AND CIVIL JUSTICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 240
(Brian H. Bornstein et al. eds., 2008).
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their liability rather than do justice to the plaintiff. In this sense, every lawsuit-
even the successful vindication of a valid claim-is a tragedy of sorts.
Nor is the passive suffering the only viable alternative to litigation in resolv-
ing disagreements. Members of common communities often resolve their
disputes through basic norms of neighborliness and informal mechanisms,
and in comparison to litigation, such methods often prove to be more efficient
and satisfying for the parties involved.13 9 Other, more formal, varieties of alter-
native dispute resolution have become increasingly popular in recent years as
well.140 These often provide many advantages over litigation. The parties
typically enjoy a more active role in the process than they would in a cour-
troom; proceedings are often confidential, protecting the parties' privacy and
reputations; and the more active involvement of a neutral third party may help
to alleviate some of the stubbornness fostered by a more adversarial process.141
In some cases, it may be better to avoid a dispute altogether. Historically,
some courts were especially wary of lawyers who were seen as encouraging
spouses to divorce in order to create business for themselves. 142 In Ohralik, the
Court seemed influenced by the fact that an attorney encouraged an injured
party to sue a family friend in order to access insurance money.143 On these
issues, the lawyer's incentives may diverge from her client's. Where the latter
seeks only to maximize her financial gains, an attorney who litigates her case on
a contingent fee basis may provide the best mechanism for serving her end. But
where a client seeks recognition, vindication, apology, or some other abstract
resolution, these goals may not comport with the lawyer's interests. In particu-
lar, the lawyer engaged in direct solicitation is unlikely to seek out clients who
desire these remedies; rather, as Model Rule 7.3 expresses, such solicitations will
typically be motivated by "pecuniary gain." 44
B. Optimizing Litigation
Stirring up litigation may impose serious costs, but do those costs outweigh
the benefits? There is reason to believe they do not. Moreover, it is possible that
139. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS
SETTLE DISPUTES (1991) (discussing the preference of residents of Shasta County
for informal methods of dispute resolution over the legal system).
140. See Marshall J. Breger, Should an Attorney Be Required To Advise a Client of ADR
Options?, 13 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 427, 428-29 (2000).
141. See Patrick J. Martell, The Net and Beyond: Dispute Resolution for the High Tech
Company, in ALI-ABA's PRACTICE CHECKLIST MANUAL ON ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 195 (Am. Law Inst. & Am. Bar Ass'n Comm. on Continuing
Profl Educ. eds., 2002).
142. See People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Berezniak, 127 N.E. 36, 37-39 (Ill. 1920).
143. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
144. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.3(a) (2000).
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whatever added litigation direct solicitation foments would, on balance, be for
the good of society.
While superior dispute resolution mechanisms may exist, there is little
reason to believe discouraging direct solicitation will somehow avail injured
parties of these options. Professor Ellickson's Shasta County rancherS145 may
employ background norms to resolve their disagreements, but theirs is a
close-knit and homogeneous community. As society becomes more urbanized
and impersonal, parties may lack the basic connections necessary to agree on
basic principles of fairness.14' A client who is unaware of his legal rights without
direct solicitation is unlikely to pursue private arbitration or mediation inde-
pendently-though, if legal counsel for the opposing party or his insurance
company contacts him first, that may be where he ultimately ends up. Clients
who would have sought legal representation even without being solicited would
still have to transact with a lawyer whose financial incentives may favor litiga-
tion over superior alternatives. In any case, receiving legal counsel-through
direct solicitation or otherwise-may better apprise clients of these options;
indeed, some have argued that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct effective-
ly require that attorneys advise clients of the possibility of alternate dispute
resolution.147
Even disregarding the viability of alternatives, there is a question as to
whether a just legal system should err on the side of too much or too little litiga-
tion. Over-litigation poses certain social costs and inefficiencies. However,
under- litigation of disputes, insofar as it endorses the acceptance of unredressed
rights, is arguably more than a social cost-it is an injustice. Moreover, even
if there exists too much litigation on a social level, certain disfavored groups,
such as the "not-quite-poor" and the "unknowledgeable, "148 may litigate insuf-
ficiently. Accordingly, a society that favors under-litigating abets not only indi-
vidual injustices, but systemic injustice as well. Ultimately, it is an a posteriori
question whether the additional litigation stirred up by direct solicitation would
be salutary, and it is almost certainly unverifiable. But in such cases, caution is
appropriate.
CONCLUSION
The current prohibition on direct solicitation serves the interests of a
favored elite. Veteran practitioners arrogate legal business to themselves at the
expense of their less-established competitors. Wealthy claimants leverage their
social connections to hire skilled attorneys, while the uneducated who seek legal
representation are left to hope for the best. The vulnerable are protected from
145. See ELLICKSON, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
146. See id. at 282.
147. See Breger, supra note 137, at 433-36.
148. See Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376-77 (1976).
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those who seek to advise and represent them, but not from third parties with
divergent interests.
If the ABA's opposition to direct solicitation arises from a genuine concern
for preventing exploitation by dishonest attorneys, there are better options.
Instead of imposing a uniform ban on direct solicitation, a better option might
be for states to regulate deceitful conduct more directly. States could mandate a
cooling off period in which clients would retain a right of cancellation over any
binding fee agreement into which they have entered.149 The legal system could
better inform litigants of their right to dismiss counsel and hire a new attorney.
Courts could apply more searching scrutiny when reviewing fee agreements that
arose from direct solicitations. Indeed, many mechanisms already exist to guar-
antee faithful representation of-and equitable dealing with-the client.
The Supreme Court's general trend toward liberalizing solicitation has been
a positive one, but the issue extends beyond the First Amendment. As a matter
of sound policy and the equal administration of justice, the ban on direct solici-
tation should be lifted.
149. See Note, supra note 13, at 1200.
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